

Resolution Of Conflicts Through Negotiated Settlement And CBM :A Case Study Of Indo-China Border Dispute

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Abstract

After its independence, India and China seemed to understand the significance of CBMs that was apparent from the Panchsheel Agreement concluded in 1954. Some researchers date nevertheless the origins of CBMs in the Sino-Indian period after the Cold War. India and China have been discussing many problems which have divided them since the 1950s to solve. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are an essential element in the process of conflict resolution. CBMs are aimed at increasing military openness, limiting the use of military equipment and military action and expressing a friendly attitude toward the other side, in order to increase mutual confidentiality, to reduce the incomprehension and mistake of military operations, which pose the risk of warfare. This study thus seeks to construct and then examine the positive and negative CBMs between India and China. It then tries to identify and critically evaluate the elements that serve as obstacles to conflict resolution. The main goal of this study is to evaluate and determine how successful the function of CBMs is in influencing dispute settlement between India and China.

1. Introduction

Each state has two dimensions of war and peace in the field of foreign policy. War is nothing's answer. By adopting this strategy, things invariably go awry. Peace, on the other hand, is all excellent. Every nation may show excellent external policies and mutual understanding by utilising peaceful co-existence. As we go forward to the next century, China and India continue to be a lengthy, convoluted connection for two of the world's most populous countries. Given their disputed borders, nuclear rivalries, their struggle for influence in Asia, their increasing economic connections and internal issues, these two countries' interactions will have a profound impact on stability and prosperity in the area. In the High Altitudes of the Himalayas, one of the most arid places in the world, the conflicting borders between China and India lie on a nobody's land, where nothing is growing and nobody lives. The steadfast pursuit of India's future policies has led China to implement an action that has had far-reaching consequences in the region and beyond. The Chinese reacted quickly and initiated well-coordinated operations, overrunning the Indian positions established as a consequence of the advance politics of the eastern and western sectors, and penetrates south of Mc Mohan Line between October 20 and 24 1962. Premier Zhou En-lei notified the governments of Afro-Asian countries that India had started huge assaults all along the border. In China, both sides were suggesting that the Prime Ministers should withdraw their troops again, but the Pundit Nehru

refused and requested that China retire before September 8, 1962. One of the longest undemarked and controversial boundaries in the world is China and India. In 1962, both nations struggled against a short but severe border conflict. Negotiations are continuing across the 2,000-mile border. India claims that China occupies Indian territory unlawfully in the contested Kashmir region. China has asserted land rights in Arunachal Pradesh's northeastern Indian state. Beijing and New Delhi have been engaged in a confidence-building process since the end of the 1970s and have sought a mutual acceptance solution to their border issues.

Negotiated settlement is a method of resolving conflicts via discussion and bilateral discussions in an environment of mutual respect and give and take. As a result, tensions and conflict are reduced, and an environment favourable to cordial bilateral relations is created. Such discussions take place between heads of state, foreign ministers, ambassadors, special representatives, or secretaries, among others. The profound distrust that existed between India and China as a result of the 1962 war was the most significant impediment to improving their ties. When a result, as leaders on both sides resolved to strengthen Sino-Indian ties, the two governments placed the start of border talks on the agenda. The goal of mediated settlement is to resolve the issue from a political standpoint between two nations as well as issues inside the country itself. Negotiated settlements, for example, may be helpful in resolving conflicts such as; (1) A negotiated solution of the ethnic war in Sri Lanka may lead to a new age of friendship between the Tamil and Sinhalese people [1]. (2) China favours a negotiated resolution of the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan and will use its clout with Islamabad to aid in the search for a peaceful solution. A number of methods may be used by negotiators. [2] The negotiator understands and strategically uses the different sources of power to accomplish the negotiators' negotiating objectives for "power negotiation."

The process of trying to settle a disagreement or conflict is conflict resolution. Successful conflict resolution is achieved by listening to the requirements of all parties and by giving chances to properly address the interests of each party so that the result may be fulfilled. Conflict practitioners speak to the parties involved about finding the win-win result, against the win-lose dynamic seen in many disputes. While conflict resolution has begun, conflict prevention seeks to resolve disputes before or before they begin verbal, physical or legal fighting and violence. While conflict resolution is a conflict that begins after conflict prevention has already started. Conflict itself has beneficial as well as bad consequences. Conflict resolution practitioners are trying to discover methods to enhance good results and reduce negative results. In conflict work, there is a disagreement over whether or not all disputes can be resolved such that the word dispute resolution is a matter of dispute. Conflict management, conflict transformation and conflict intervention are other frequent words. Conflict management may be an overall process where the parties manage conflict in the direction of conclusion. Conflict management However it is also known as a scenario in which conflict is a purposeful personal, social and organisational instrument, utilised in particular by competent politicians and other social engineers. Conflict practitioners operate in various fields of conflict - in international, national, interpersonal and interpersonal contexts.

This study has been divided as follow, First we will discuss about border issue between India and China where we will examine all the aspects and factual information from different studies. Then we will discuss regarding "Join Working group", which was formed to address these disputes between both countries. In next section we will give a factual information regarding various summit at

different times. Then author examine trade relation between India and China , then author will examine the CBM and its impact .And finally conclusion will be drawn.

2. Border dispute between India and China

For ages, India and China, both ancient civilizations, have been friendly neighbours. The "Hindi Chini Bhai" syndrome remained unchanged ideologically until towards the end of the 50s, when indications of conflict began to appear. The surrounding nations have excellent relations with India. Exports and imports are essential for this process to continue and for nations to cooperate mutually. India has borders with nearly everyone of its neighbouring countries (Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar), although none has caused significant conflicts with India. In the 1960s and subsequently in the 1990s, China was engaged in the settlement of the borders[3]. There is and is not a territorial issue more sensitive to me than the border dispute between India and China. All parties have their essential security of interest within their control which has not been discussed. The Mohan line is mine in India, the Aksai Chin is China's. Only a political strategy, culminating in a high level decision, can resolve the issue. It will be half a century in a few months since the problems have been united. Since China accepted the Mc Mohan line with regard to the Burmese, there was no disagreement. China may potentially acknowledge itself as a member of China[4]. During the SinoIndian War, sovereignty was disputed over two distinct geographical parts. One is Aksai Chin in the Indian Cashmir province or in the western Chinese Xinjiang region. The Xinjiang-Tibet Highway is a totally deserted high-altitude wilderness. The second region under contention is to the east and is referred to both India and China as Arunachal Pradesh. There are several native tribes in this diminishingly populated region.

To now, the Chinese claim to Indian regions is based on the McMahon Line not being recognised, irrespective of the recognised autonomy of Tibet and the acceptance of the McMahon Line on Tibet's grounds. Taking advantage of the chance to expand in the late fifties, they used the strange reasoning that was legally binding had Tibet been legal part of China: The first is that (again, assuming that Tibet is a legal China), Tibetans cannot legally sign the Simla Convention in their capacity as a province of China. The accord was believed to include a Tibetan representative and that, when the Chou Enlai visited the country in 1954, he personally assuring Nehru of Tibetan autonomy. Moreover, the Chinese were never real signatories of the Simla Agreement, which the Tibetans and the British agreed on. As an agreement on boundary delineation is not legitimate unilateral (only British, because the signature of Tibet does not legally bind) the McMahon line, as inherited from India, is in jeopardy. Had these historical facts been aggressively presented by the Indian government during the 1950 Chinese invasion of Tibet, the situation would have been appreciated by the whole world and the position of the Indian locus reinforced. Rather, Mr Nehru prefers China's strategy of appeasement and capitulation and accepts the enormous status quo shift. Irrespective of the popular uproar and wound, the government of India has gone so far as to oppose the consideration of the petition from Tibet to the United Nations General Assembly on 23 Nov 1950. The most important thing in policy was to foster Chinese relations with the purchase of it. This was a very terrible path to follow, as circumstances had to show later.

The border dispute resolution methods were in line with the progress of the two nations' political ties. However, in 2003, there were no discussions between authorities in both nations. One thing the Chinese were clear: peace and calm along the LAC weren't identical with their alignment. The procedure of defining the LAC set forth in the 1993 Agreement was re-routed. In July 2002, the two

sides viewed each other's Western Sector maps after exchanges of maps of the centre sector. Both of them had such a discrepancy as to make little difference. By 2005, the procedure finally ended.[5][6]

On 23 June 2003, the Declaration on the principles of economic cooperation and comprehensive collaboration was drawn up by both countries. However, an important choice was to remove the border issue from the powers of the authorities and give it a political deal which "examine the framework of a border settlement" from a political viewpoint of the whole relationship. This was a change from the stance of India, which had until now maintained that by Treaty, custom and use, the frontiers between India and China were fixed.[6]The generally good nature of the two sides' ties continued until 2005, when nations signed a new agreement on management of military relations during their visit to Premier Wen Jiabao . Above all they reached a broad agreement on "political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the borders issue" based on the work of the two major representatives of their country. The border should "along be clearly and readily identified natural geographical characteristics" according to Article VI of the Agreement, something which India has suggested for a while. However, more importance was attached to Article IV and Article VII of the accord. The first said that a settlement would "take" account of each other's strategic interests while the second highlighted the interest of the resident population of the border regions would be "safeguarded." This indicated that a framework for developing the border settlement may be rapidly provided on the basis of a raw exchange of claims between the two nations. [7]

But Beijing started to retreat because of the unexpected good shift in India-US relations leading to its nuclear agreement. The official from Arunachal Pradesh was refused a visa by China in 2007. Visas of candidates from Jammu and Cashmir were also initiated. China started to reassert its claim to Arunachal Pradesh in particular, in addition to rigorous patrols. The Chinese disagreed with a visit to Tawang in October 2009 by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as well as a visit by the Dalai Lama in November.

Chinese policies have changed, emphasised by the economic downturn in the West, which has seen the world position of China springing forward. It was, no surprise, followed by a higher degree of Chinese commitment, for example in the islands of Senkaku/Diayou, the South China Sea and in bordering India and China. The ramifications of this have subsequently been addressed in India, Japan, Philippines and Vietnam,. The discussions of the special representatives have been slowed considerably. The Special Representatives have resumed their work after fulfilling the Agreement on Guidelines for 2005. The deterioration in political relations can only have an impact on their conversation. In the thirteenth round of negotiations of the special representatives in 2009, both parties broadened their dialogue to encompass their whole spectrum and indicated their main mission to settle the border issue to the highway block in a kind of way. The border discussions to achieve a framework agreement were restarted with the visit of Mr. Shivshankar Menon .

As it translates into the borderline the framework agreement is the most complicated one. The third phase consists of the current delimitation and delimitation of the boundary on the map. Chinese Ambassador Wei Wei stated in a media storey in May 2013 that both parties had agreed at an 18-point settlement framework agreement. The previous Special Representative Shivshankar Menon

said in an interview in 2015 with Sheela Bhatt of Rediff.com: "We have done all technical to do. It's a matter of a policy choice now." [8][9]

But only when clarity is established about China's bargaining position will the framework agreement emerge. China plans, according to the Indian negotiators, to provide India with demands not just in western India, Aksai Chin, but also in the east. A negotiation in which "what is yours, and what is mine, is negotiationsable"

The Chinese have two main claims in regard to what India considers its own land. One claim for the West is Aksai Chin, in Jammu and Kashmir, in the northeast area of Ladakh District. The second claim in the eastern sector relates in particular to a portion of the British Northeast Frontier Agency, which was renamed Arunachal Pradesh and became a state in the disputed part of India. The well-trained and equipped Chinese soldiers were appropriately acclimatised in the struggle over these regions to combat high elevations. The Chinese invaded India on October 20th 1962 and were unable to accommodate politically on disputed land along the 3,225-kilometer boundary with the Himalayas. At that time, nine divisions were deployed along the Himalayan frontier with China from the eastern and western commands. None of these divisions had reached their full force and were not all equipped with artillery, tanks, and even sufficient clothing items. At the north-West end of the Aksai Chin Plateau and in Pangong Lakes region, approximately 160 kilometres southeast, the Chinese assaulted in Ladakh to the south of the Passo Karakoram. Indian troops in the Karakoram Pass region were easily displaced from their positions and from most of the stations around Pangong Lake. The Demchok and Jara La were soon overcome by other Chinese troops in the vicinities of Demchok (about 160 kilometres south-east of Chusul). In the eastern sector of Assam, despite Indian opposition attempts, Chinese troops progressed smoothly. The disputed boundary claims have been resolved since the Chinese-Indian border war in 1962. In order to promote "confidence building measures" between Indian and Chinese military powers, after more than thirty years of frontier tension, high level bilateral negotiations started in New Delhi in February 1994 [10].

The situation has remained stable since 1962 in what is known as the LAC, and bilateral talks on a solution to the dispute have taken place between the parties. A Joint Task Force (JTG) was established up in November 1988 to settle the boundary issue, with 12 sessions to date. In agreements between 1993 and 1996, the two parties renounced the use of force to resolve the issue. Several efforts to establish trust have been implemented. In India the issue is sectoral, whereas in China the conflict is favoured as a "package." However, it has generally accepted, since 1985, India's sectoral strategy (which emphasises the need for a holistic approach), the Mac Mohan Line for discussion in the eastern sector and the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 (which is approximately in line with China's previous claims) for Ladakh. In September 1993 the JWG was assisted by a high level Chinese-Indian Expert Group. The Chinese-Indian ties worsened, but have subsequently improving, after India's nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. For the first time, in November 2000, maps of each side's boundary were exchanged, and it was agreed in January 2001 that the border demarcation process was accelerated. During 2001 and 2002 high-level visits on both sides have clearly established an atmosphere for peaceful dispute settlement. In contrast to the war with India-Pakistan, attempts to resolve conflicts have been characterised by a certain degree of flexibility, reciprocity and moderation.

India's commitment to peaceful settling of disputes: the treaty with Nepal is another milestone in our efforts to keep our neighbours cordial. Loyalty to the concept of peaceful coexistence prompted India to emphasise the extremely important but related notion that all international conflicts are settled peacefully. In the aftermath of a terrible global war, which included the use of atomic bombs on the innocent people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan), India was sceptical of the use of force in international affairs. "A war-friendly, but restricted, globe would become a war-friended world that knows mankind's experience," Nehru remarked. The enormous spread of weapons and technological expertise and the catastrophic end to such methods have made it essential to stress the advantages of the peaceful resolution of international conflicts on a number of occasions. India has always pursued a strategy of cordial relations with a view to fostering goodwill and cooperation, in preserving peace in Southern Asia. An significant accords like the 1960 Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan were concluded with a constructive approach. The 1962 Chinese border conflict and the three Pakistan wars again made it necessary to resolve the tension in a peaceful way. The Shimla Accord and the Sino-Indian discussions are excellent examples. The establishment of the Regional Cooperation Association of South Asia (SAARC) has been beneficial. The room for successful regional cooperation exercise was given for. With the establishment of the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), trade and economic ties are progressively expanding throughout the area. Due to China's fast economic growth and development, its position in the international community has shifted. Indeed, by accepting its 'new' role as a responsible stakeholder, "China has the responsibility to defend justice and protect global peace [11][12]."

The Joint Working Group

The graphs of Indo-China ties are not particularly straight. They are not zigzagging as a result of their foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. There is a lot of debate and research on the contentious topic of their border dispute. Both parties have used different methods and technologies to address the issue and preserve good and friendly relations. From Nehru and Krishna Menon through Rajiv Gandhi, Li Peng, Qian Qichen, P.V. Narasimha Rao, and other decision-makers, attempts were made to restore tranquillity and peace to the region. The Joint Working Group is an important, central, and dynamic component of this process. The Joint Working Group (J.W.G.) was established during Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing in 1988 to accelerate bilateral talks [13]. It proved to be the most important and all-encompassing platform for addressing all elements of Sino-Indian relations [14]. In his dinner address on December 19, 1988, the Prime Minister said that the border issue "must be resolved within a reasonable time period." Surprisingly, it was claimed that the working committee will, among other things, examine Deng's 1979-80 plan [15]. Two senior Chinese officials acknowledged their satisfaction with the series of Sino-Indian talks that began with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's December visit and encouraged the process's continuation. The Chinese authorities said that the Prime Minister's visit elevated the two nations' relationship to a new level and provided them with fresh directions [16].

3 Visits of Heads of State/Heads of Government(Summit)

The summit meeting (or summit) is a gathering of Heads of State or Government with typically significant exposure to the media, strict security and pre-arranged diplomatic negotiating agenda and facilitated international stress including any meeting or conference of senior officials, managers,

etc. Several talks between India and China have been conducted occasionally. In this chapter, we covered several major Indo-China summits, where ties and international affairs were significant.

India became the first non-socialist bloc to establish diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China on 1 April 1950. In October 1954 Premier Nehru came to China. Although the Border War in 1962 was a blow to links, the historic visit by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 began to restore bilateral relations. In 1993, the signature, during a visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, of a peacekeeping and peaceful agreement along the line of current control over the India-China borders showed the increasing stability in bilateral relations. During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's 2003 visit, India and China signed the Declaration on Relationships and Integrated Cooperation Principles, and also agreed to appoint Special Representatives (SRs) to investigate the border settlement mechanism. The two parties established a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity on their visit to Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in April 2005.

The bilateral ties between India and China in the last decade have grown and varied. The two sides established a Closer Developmental Partnership at the centre of our bilateral connection during President Xi Jinping's visit to India in September 2014. In addition, in different areas including trade and trade, railroads, space- collaboration, drug products, industrial park creation and sister-city partnerships a total of 16 agreements have been inked. Both parties also signed an MoU to open the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra road to Nathu La. In May 2015, Premier Narendra Modi visited China. The inaugural session of the First State/Provincial Leader Forum in Beijing was also addressed during the visit by Prime Minister Modi and Minister Li Keqiang.

In May 2016, President Pranab Mukherjee visited China. He visited Guangdong and Peking to meet with the Chinese government, and 10 Education and Research MoUs were completed during his tour. In 2018, the velocity of ties was increasing. The inaugural Informative Summit took place in Wuhan in April 2018 between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi to share ideas on broad bilateral and global problems and to expound on their different perspectives and national development goals. The leaders agreed that efforts to develop convergence via the existing channels to provide the widest platform feasible for the partnership should be substantially enhanced. Both presidents also attended numerous international summit meetings in each other's nations. In the G20 Summit held in Hangzhou, in September 2016, Prime Minister Modi visited China to attend the Xiamen BRICS Summit. In June 2018, PM Modi was present at the Qingdao SCO Summit last year. Two agreements on hydrological information on the Brahmaputra River and on rice export phytosanitary standards were reached during a bilateral meeting with President Xi on the margins of this summit. In October 2016, President Xi visited India to attend the Goa BRICS Summit. On 13 June 2019, the first meeting of the two leaders was recently held in Bishkek on the sidelines of the SCO Summit since Prime Minister Modi was reelected.

4. Trade and business relations

In recent years there have been significant development of commercial and economic ties between India and China. At the beginning of the century, the amount of trade between the two nations was at 3 trillion dollars. In 2008, US\$ 51.8 billion in bilateral trade, displacing China as India's biggest trading partner of products with the United States. Bilateral trade reached a total of 95.54 billion dollars at all times in 2018. India's exports amounted to 18.84 billion US dollars of the overall bilateral trade volume of 95.54 billion US dollars. India was Chinese goods' 7th biggest export

destination and China's 27th largest exporter. The commerce between India and China was USD 53.3 billion from January to July 2019. Indian exports to China were 10.38 billion dollars (5.02% decrease) while China exports to India totalled 42.92 billion dollars (2.51 percent decline). The cotton, copper and diamonds/natural jewels comprised India's main export commodities. Machinery, electricity and telecom equipment, organic chemicals and fertilisers are major Chinese exports. While the commerce between India and China has increased rapidly, the largest single imbalance we have with any nation has also occurred. In 2018, a deficit of 57,86 billion dollars grew. Indian medicines, IT services, engineering and farming goods, including rice, sugar, different fruit and herbs, oil-based food, meat and cotton thread and fabric, have been discussed on trade imbalances. During President Xi's visit to India in September 2014, the Five Year Development Program for Economic and Trade Cooperation between India and China was established to address this severe problem and improve market access for more Indian goods in China[17].

5 Confidence Building Measures (CBM)

In the security studies literature, the phrase "confidence building" still lacks an exact or uniform meaning. The EU is a result of the experience gained through European conflict management and was originally introduced in the wording of the Helsinki Final Agreement, which referred to confidence-building measures not only as military operations, but also as economic, social and cultural activities. This viewpoint is founded on the idea that diverse types of collaboration assist improve shared understanding while also reducing the risk of conflicts by emphasising the advantages and possibilities coming from other elements of interactions. Other resources describe confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) as formally and informally action that addresses or prevents or solves national issues and includes include political and military components, whether unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. The phrase is used in Asian security jargon, in particular in the search for solutions to animosities between the main powers in the area and long-term flashpoints such as India-Pakistan, the Korean Peninsula War and tension in Taiwan's Straits. [18]. Limiting or decreasing anxiety among conflicting parties is critical for fostering trust and a feeling of security. Confidence-building measures (CBMs) seek to reduce fear and mistrust by making the conduct of the parties more predictable. CBMs are agreements between two or more parties about information sharing and verification, usually including the employment of armed troops and weapons. Some initiatives seek to increase the transparency of military capabilities and to explain the purpose of military and political operations. Others create regulations for the mobility of armed troops, as well as procedures to ensure that such laws are followed . Such agreements are intended to foster confidence among disputing parties and minimise escalation. While a single CBM is unlikely to avert violence or contribute to peacekeeping, a succession of such agreements may provide improved security. Such approaches may eventually alter people's perceptions of a country's security requirements [19].

The goal of confidence-building initiatives is to help reduce or eliminate the causes of distrust, fear, tensions, and hostility, which are major elements driving the worldwide arms race. In 1981, the United Nations published its report on confidence-building measures to clarify, develop and guide governments in implementation and measures to strengthen confidence-building, as well as public understanding of the concept to promote negotiations and improve peace and safety. The UN also published a report to the United Nations on confidence-building measures. The General Assembly invited the Member States to consider, in the same year, the adoption of confidence building

measures within their respective territories and to negotiate, where possible, in line with these regions' conditions and requirements. Indeed, international talks on these problems have been ongoing since the early 1970s. During the Cold War years, the motivation for CBMs emerged from shared fears of an inadvertent escalation due to the severe security situation. One of the main objectives of CBMs of the first generation was to reduce misconceptions, misunderstandings and errors regarding military operations and intentions by making critical information available to stakeholders [20]. As a consequence, the CBMs aimed at building mutual confidence and opening up the way to arms control and disarmament[21] in due course. This is characterised as confidence-and-security building measures since they now involve not just increasing confidence but also increasing security (CSBMs). As a result, confidence building is now defined as "a distinct type of security management activity that entails the comprehensive process of exploring, negotiating, and then implementing information, interaction, and constraint measures in accordance with primarily cooperative practises and principles." Both China and India have evolved distinct views on CBMs that reflect not just their historical, cultural, and strategic thinking, but also their geographical contexts. A significant advancement in military CBMs occurred in 2006, with the visit of then-Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Beijing. Both countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the first ever to establish a high-level military exchange, joint exercises, counter-terrorism and piracy cooperation between the two defence ministries.

In December 2007, the both countries has also started an annual defence dialogue. The defence secretary represented India, while a high-ranking PLA official represented China. The second debate took place in Belgaum, Karnataka, in December 2008, and the third in January 2010. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, peacekeeping on the LAC, cooperation drills, and sporting activities were among the issues discussed. The fourth round was conducted in December 2011 after India put off the process in August 2010 after China's rejection to grant a visa to a senior Indian military officer. The fifth, sixth, and seventh rounds were conducted in January 2013, February 2014, and April 2015.

The first re-structured strategic debate was held in February 2017 by Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui and Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar. Despite these attempts, China has continued to exert pressure on the LAC. This was because both Tibet's policies and the expanded border construction permitted China to create a railway and many side roads with border radials. Two developments have emerged over the past 2 years: the April – May 2013 assault of the Depsang Plains, just before Li Keqiang's visit on 19 May and the September 2014 Chumur conflict, when President Xi Jinping visited India. [22]

In response to Indian attempts to strengthen its border defences, China has suggested that both nations sign the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement since 2008. China asked India to stop constructing the borders in bilateral talks, stating that in the light of the other CBMs, it was not required. India rejected it, on the other hand. A working consultative and coordination mechanism on India–China border matters was agreed in January 2012 by both parties. That was not enough to prevent the Depsang confrontation in March 2013. The signature of the BDCA came following the ceremony on 13 October 2013. A protocole on CBM in the military sector was signed in 2005 by Chinese Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Dawei. The Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration between the two Ministries of Defense was signed in 2006 by the two ministers.[17]

Realistic Barriers to Sino-Indian CBM Implementation While China and India have made significant gains in fostering trust over the last two decades, and the two CBM agreements have certain verifiable measures, hurdles to implementation persist. The three models imply that joint monitoring is feasible and should be pursued. The choices vary from very simple, information-exchange CBMs to more rigorous verification as the two parties develop trust and confidence in understanding technology-based methods. In this respect, successful execution of existing laws necessitates the two parties confronting and overcoming both political and technical obstacles. The first has never been simple and has grown more difficult in the wake of Indian nuclear testing, as well as lingering disputes between the two nations over a variety of topics, including allegations of China continuing to provide sensitive technology to Pakistan. Even if the political will existed, the intricacy of verification and monitoring through different technological methods, along with geographical realities, would make joint monitoring both intimidating and gratifying. The modes of the United States-South Vietnam, Europe, and Sinai have demonstration rather than transformative importance; that is, they have taken a long time to acquire experience. There is considerably less experience with, much alone desire for, verification in bilateral contexts in the Sino-Indian context. Second, there are financial limitations that must also be considered. Technology both conserves and depletes resources. There are a number of key passes along the 2,000-kilometer Sino-Indian LAC where military actions may and have occurred in the past. It would be very expensive to monitor all of them; both nations are still basically developing, with huge populations and little economic resources. Cooperative monitoring should be done on a small basis at first, and just for demonstration reasons. High-tech, high-budget solutions would not be suitable here; the distances are too great, and support technology in these distant regions is not very sophisticated. At this time, a grandiose design is out of the question. Finally, because of the technical difficulties that the two nations confront, the Sino-Indian example warns against importing cooperative monitoring methods from other countries. Neither nation has any prior experience creating and implementing monitoring models that include the use of different technology-based instruments. Personnel training in equipment operation and maintenance would be required. The training would be a useful CBM in and of itself. While the uniqueness of the possible application in the Sino-Indian instance makes this a suitable field for technological collaboration, the development of the partnership itself requires time. It may take many years to agree on, develop, field-test, and purchase a full system.

6. Conclusion

Friendship, sentimentalism, anxiety, hesitancy, brinksmanship, wishful thinking, and engagement have characterised India's China policy. This combination of views reflects the relationship's complexities, our challenges in handling China's challenge, the character of the Chinese regime, China's strategic edge over India, and China's recent fulgurating ascent. The current geopolitical environment offers both difficulties and possibilities for India and China. If the difficulties are overcome and the possibilities are properly exploited, the two nations may quickly become a major and stabilising influence in global affairs. The industrialised nations may therefore have to prepare for a new future, one in which they must learn to share political and economic power in ways they have never done before. Despite their differing perspectives on the question of sovereignty over disputed regions along their border, India and China may reach an agreement via daring and creative thinking in both nations. This would not necessarily result in a return to the Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai relationship, but it would send a powerful signal to the world that the two nations are now ready to play their prospective roles as partners in the endeavour to create a stable and peaceful global

order. It is encouraging to observe that ties between India and China have gradually improved in recent decades. A bright future awaits our two historic civilizations as they embark on a road of mutual rediscovery and collaboration in the modern age to promote peace and stability in Asia and the overall enrichment of life on the planet. In the current situation, I think our two nations should place more emphasis and urgency on settling the border issue in a fair, reasonable, and long-term manner, as well as in a spirit of accommodating each other's concerns and acknowledging ground realities.

The disputed areas between China and India are situated in a no-land man's where nothing grows and no one lives, high in the Himalayas, one of the world's most desolate places. India's persistent pursuit of its forward policy eventually prompted China to respond in a way that has far-reaching consequences in the region and across the globe. As the Indian forward push continued, the Chinese reacted forcefully, launching well-coordinated operations between October 20 and 24, 1962, overrunning Indian positions established as a consequence of the advance strategy in both the eastern and western sectors, and reaching south of the Mc Mohan Line. Premier Zhou En-lai notified the governments of Afro-Asian countries that India had started major assaults all along the border. China offered that both sides withdraw their troops and that the Prime Ministers meet again, but Pandit Nehru rejected these proposals and instead proposed that China return to its pre-September 8, 1962 posture. China and India have one of the world's longest unmarked and disputed boundaries. In 1962, the two nations engaged in a short but brutal border conflict. The 2,000-mile boundary is still being negotiated. Among the issues at stake is India's claim that China is unlawfully occupying Indian land in the disputed region of Kashmir. China has claimed ownership of territory in Arunachal Pradesh, a state in northeast India. Since the late 1970s, Beijing and New Delhi have been working to develop trust and find a mutually acceptable solution to their border issues. The procedure was divided into three different yet interconnected stages of activity: 1) summit meetings between the two countries' chiefs of state; 2) frequent ministerial visits, including military exchanges; and 3) border negotiations (1981-87) and Joint Working Group meetings (1989-present). China and India signed two agreements in 1993 and 1996 to preserve peace and tranquillity and to develop trust in the military field along the line of actual control (LAC) and in border regions. Despite the setback caused by India's nuclear tests in May 1998, this confidence-building approach has got bilateral ties back on track and is expected to accelerate the pace of normalisation. This research has been designed to provide insight into conflict resolution via negotiated settlement of the Indo-China boundary issue, which has been detailed in detail.

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